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Abstract: Security strategies are important sites for narrating the EU into existence as a 
security actor. The unveiling of a new global strategy on foreign and security policy for the EU 
immediately post-Brexit could be conceived as a pledge to remain together as a Union for the 
purposes of contributing to global security in a particular way. This paper offers a brief stock-
taking of the EU’s way of writing security from the European Security Strategy (2003) to the 
EU Global Strategy (2016). A concise exegesis of these documents exposes an interesting 
dynamic: as exercises in ordering the world, both strategic guidelines have turned out to be 
major exercises in ordering the self. The comparative snapshot shows the EU as increasingly 
anxious to prove its relevance for its own citizens, yet notably less confident about its actual 
convincingness as an ontological security framework for the EU’s constituent members over 
time. 
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This strategy, this collective vision,  




The debate on the EU’s global actorness has been marred by trimming the Union to fit theories 
of security and diplomacy bound by nationalist straightjackets. It has been commonplace to 
conclude that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU can really be a very 
minimalist affair, providing only a hybrid and weak agency for the EU as an autonomous 
security actor.2 Yet, one is hard-pressed to find another international actor so obsessed about 
its global outreach, security identity and international credibility as the EU. The EU’s security 
strategies are illustrative of the complex entangling of the EU’s evidently increasing aspiration 
to provide ontological and physical security for its citizens, along with its equally heightened 
sense of responsibility and at times bravado for serving as a ‘force for good’ in the world at 
large.3 Due to its peculiar structure and intricate functioning mechanisms,4 the EU’s efficiency 
and autonomy as a security actor are but limited compared to some of its well-endowed member 
states. Unlike NATO that was established as a defence alliance in the first place, the EU has 
grown into the role of a sui generis security provider. Consequently, it seems to suffer from a 
case of status anxiety as a security actor, all the more one with a global reach, still struggling 
to live up to the ideal-type state. 
 
The academic field of EU studies has only capitalized on this propensity to perpetual tail-
chasing. The amount of introspection generated by even the seemingly incremental policy 
moves of the EU in the field of its external action, security and defence is indeed quite 
extraordinary.5 So are the schisms in the discourse reflecting on the nature and efficiency of 
the EU as an actor in the world stage. For the more upbeat, the EU is a ‘postmodern’ polity, 
transcending the territorial state;6 a ‘normative/ethical power’,7 awarded with the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 2012 ‘for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, 
democracy and human rights in Europe’,8 or indeed an emerging ‘global power’.9 For others, 
it is a ‘fringe player’ in the traditional diplomatic order of states;10 a ‘tragic actor’,11 who has 
been ‘sleepwalking into ever deeper strategic commitments with scant strategic thought’;12 
bound to battle with the perpetual ‘capabilities-expectations’ gap,13 with a security identity 
‘still in its infancy’14 due to its inability to forge a strategic culture before developing as a 
supranational federal state.15 
 
The first security strategy of the Union – the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 – is no 
exception. It has been vigorously commented upon and anxiously pondered about in intense 
expectation of a strategic review of sorts16 – which has materialized with Federica Mogherini’s 
presentation of a new EU Global Strategy (EUGS) to the European Council on 28 June 2016. 
The latter’s timing is evocative in its own right: drafted on the heels of the eurozone and 
refugee/migration crisis, and launched just days after the British decision to leave the EU, it 
could be read as a severe case of denial or an exemplary show-off of the EU’s ability to thrive 
in crisis and keep searching for its lost ‘soul’ in its midst.17 Why outline a set of strategic 
guidelines for engaging more productively with the external world if the internal turmoil has 
reached just another saturation point – and boiled over? Just as the ESS of 2003 was to a large 
degree about contributing to its own crisis management after the diplomatic debacle over the 
invasion of Iraq within Europe and between the EU and the US,18 the decision to come forward 
with the EUGS immediately after the Brexit vote likewise reads as an internal crisis 
containment exercise.  
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This is paradoxical considering that since the official launch of a period of strategic reflection 
over the contents of the EU Global Strategy the gist has been to endorse the global actorness 
of the EU. Understanding grand strategy as an intention, with Jennifer Mitzen, the unveiling 
of a new global strategy on foreign and security policy for the EU immediately post-Brexit 
comes across as a forcefully stated joint commitment to contribute to global security in a 
particular way.19 Moreover, it could also be conceived as a pledge to remain together as a 
Union for the purposes of that goal.20 It creates an internal obligation to the EU as a collective 
body to follow through with its shared commitment to pursue security goals together, and an 
external one to other global stakeholders. The EUGS thus appears as a strategy of survival in 
a broader sense: it not only provides the guidelines for managing the security of and for the 
citizens of the Union, but powerfully also serves as a re-affirmation of the EU’s will to survive 
in the first place, to maintain its position as a relevant actor on world stage whilst living through 
a major legitimacy crisis in its history. Signifying proactive stance toward the political 
environment, the EU’s new global strategy comes across as an antipode of muddling through.21 
This article will not ask the ‘how efficient’-question typical of the analyses of the EU security 
and defence policy. It would anyway be too early to speculate on the prospects of the EUGS to 
heal the newest – and indeed existentially proportioned – rift that has occurred within the Union 
itself, facing a host of uncertainties with the UK’s decision to leave. Instead, it provides a brief 
stock-taking of the EU’s way of writing security22 over the devil’s dozen years between the 
ESS and EUGS through the concept of ontological security. Ontological security theorizations 
and applications in International Relations (IR) generally suggest that all social actors crave 
for ‘security as being’ besides ‘security as survival’.23 States, among others, accordingly seek 
a stable sense of self in order to realize their continuous agency. Scholars mainly diverge in 
their corresponding emphases on the inter-subjective (external) or intra-subjective (internal) 
constitution of state identity, highlighting an urge to establish routines in relations with other 
states or ability to uphold a consistent biographical narrative respectively.24 
 
I proceed from an assumption that the ESS and EUGS are important folios illuminating the 
ways the EU narrates its identity across the internal/external division. My account stretches 
Brent Steele’s argument on the importance of state’s ability to tell convincing stories about its 
self through autobiographical narratives for its ontological security to the level of the EU.25 
Accordingly, the EU’s security strategies could be read as the Union’s published 
‘autobiographies’, outlining its conception of self as a security actor of a particular kind, with 
particular self-identity commitments in the world.26 Taking a further cue from Jef Huysmans’s 
distinct conceptualization of ontological security, 27 the ESS and EUGS emerge as important 
sites of managing the EU’s anxiety in the world of quickly multiplying ‘unknown unknowns’.  
 
By definition, security strategies seek to repress ambiguity in an attempt to create some sort of 
order out of the surrounding uncertainty, or lurking chaos. The ESS and EUGS are similarly 
exercises in ordering the world by establishing knowledge claims about ‘how the world works’ 
and thus attempting to keep the fundamental dread of uncertainty at bay.28 The latest EU 
security strategy acknowledges prominently the Union’s intensified sense of insecurity arising 
from the growing global interdependence, ‘a world devoid of certainty, of knowing what 
tomorrow holds’ where the life once led ‘is being contested and changed at the same time’.29 
This is where Huysmans’s original conceptualization of ‘security’ as a ‘thick signifier’ that 
defines social relations in relation to death provides an especially productive lens for analysing 
the EU’s concurrent striving for ‘daily security’ and ‘ontological security’.  
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These two potentially distinct signifying practices articulate a strategy of survival by 
countering objectified threats and ‘managing the limits of reflexivity [...] by fixing social 
relations into a symbolic and institutional order’, correspondingly. Whereas daily security 
concerns the mediation of friends and enemies, ontological security pertains to ‘the general 
question of the political’ rather than constructing concrete enemies or enumerating specific 
threats.30 The ESS and EUGS illuminate the dual functions of major strategic vision documents 
of the kind in providing concrete guidelines for engaging with the world to ensure survival 
along with a political rationale to live at peace with oneself and to be recognized as a legitimate 
actor in the world arena. Accommodating these divergent aims will inevitably be practically as 
arduous as it is ethically thorny.  
 
In its quest to provide comprehensive security for its citizens and be concurrently recognized 
as a legitimate global actor among the traditional security providers in the international system 
of states, the EU faces a paradox. Its efficiency as a security provider could only be increased 
by further federalization of the EU’s security and defence policy provisions (on top of beefing 
up its pertinent capabilities, of course). This would, however, only exacerbate the EU’s already 
severe legitimacy problem in the eyes of the people of the Union and increase their alienation 
from the European project. The flip side of the EU’s stepped-up efficiency and credibility as a 
global security actor would thus be a serious undermining of its ability to offer its citizens a 
commonly shared and valued ontological framework, maintaining a sense of closeness, 
transparency, intelligibility and ownership for the citizens of its constitutive states. The UK’s 
decision to leave the EU could accordingly also be read as a pained reaction to the latter’s 
growing ambitions to step on the heels of the state in claiming itself major status as a security 
provider for the EU citizens. 
I suggest that the ESS and EUGS speak volumes about the EU’s identity-building aspirations 
and, by extension, ontological security concerns. Departing from a narrative understanding of 
identity,31 the ensuing snapshot of the ESS and EUGS charts the story the EU tells about itself 
and the world in 2003 and 2016. I am particularly interested in the EU’s construction of the 
meaning of security in its two major security strategies and the broader political work these 
documents do for the EU as a polity. Taking a general cue from recent advancements of the 
study of temporality and status-seeking behaviour in world politics,32 it is of interest to examine 
whether the EU sees itself as improving or declining as a credible security actor over time in 
its strategic scripts. Regarding the ESS and the EUGS as key devices of rhetorical signaling of 
the Union’s status-seeking as a security actor,33 what concrete evidence can we find from these 
documents about the EU’s confidence in evaluating itself as a security actor of a particular kind 
over time?  
 
The European Security Strategy of 2003 
The ESS, with a subtitle ‘A secure Europe in a better world’,34 marked the EU’s coming of age 
as a strategic actor, aiming to constitute and communicate its ambition to become and be 
recognized as one. It is the first comprehensive communication of the EU’s status aspirations 
as a security actor, constituting a status symbol in itself. The document displays a rather 
absolutist understanding of security, assuming it to be an eventually achievable state. It also 
showcases the EU’s explicitly transformative zeal, putting an emphasis on spreading good 
governance, especially rule of law and protecting human rights as well as democracy promotion 
more generally. Its opening accord (‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so 
free’) celebrates Europe as a peace project, taking core credit for having reached ‘a period of 
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peace and stability unprecedented in European history’ inter alia via enlargement policy.  
Its main target audience – and key contextualizing (f)actor due to the Iraq dispute that laid bare 
the divisions not just between the American ‘Mars’ and European ‘Venus’35 – is the USA 
whose dominant position as a military actor is duly recognized, yet also subtly criticized (‘no 
single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own’) in the ESS. Hence, the 
announcement of the EU’s intention to ‘share in the responsibility for global security and in 
building a better world’ and call for a more active pursuance of the Union’s strategic objectives. 
This is mainly done by establishing a clear security-development nexus, linking poverty and 
economic failure to political problems and violent conflicts in the world, thus enabling to 
capitalize on the EU’s more developed civilian capabilities, including various assistance 
programmes, conditionality and trade measures. However, in order for a more responsible and 
active EU to emerge, carrying ‘greater political weight’, the development of ‘a strategic culture 
that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention’ was forcefully called for as 
well. To fulfil the ambition of contributing to a wider spectrum of missions and sustaining 
several operations simultaneously, engaging both civilian and military measures, more 
resources were to be dedicated for defence. The defence spending was to be used more 
effectively, reducing duplication of assets and improving shared intelligence between EU 
member states and partners. This high-flown promise remains yet to be materialized. 
The ESS depicts ‘the post-Cold War environment’ as inhabited by ‘more diverse, less visible, 
and less predictable’ new threats, ranging from terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, state failure and organized crime to more traditional regional conflicts. Internal 
and external security have thus become entangled to the degree of near-impossible distinction. 
Meanwhile, large-scale military aggression against any EU member state is regarded as 
‘improbable’. Since this mixture of threats is dynamic, preventive engagement is regarded as 
key (‘threat prevention cannot start too early’). While the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
is considered to be a strategic priority for Europe, security-building in the (then soon-to-be 
enlarged) Europe’s eastern neighbourhood, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean area emerges 
as the key regional foci of the ESS.  
 
The catchword of the ESS is ‘effective multilateralism’ which is envisioned as providing the 
basis for an international order. Such a clarion call for a ‘stronger international society, well-
functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order’, fundamentally 
framed by the UN Charter, naturally bespeaks of the EU’s discomfort with the post-9/11 USA’ 
increasing unilateralism and bypassing of the UN Security Council, emphatically depicted as 
having ‘the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’. 
The close working together with the UN was hoped to be complemented with the EU-NATO 
strategic partnership in crisis management – another false promise so far. 
 
The EU’s aspiration to become a ‘global power’ is well highlighted throughout the ESS, but 
the strategy fails to lay out clear policy objectives, means, and instruments.36 The ESS displays 
comprehensive ambition across Christopher Hill’s taxonomy of the EU’s possible functions 
(that is, a superpower, a regional pacifier, a global intervener, a mediator of conflicts, a bridge 
between the rich and the poor, and a joint supervisor of the world economy)37 and Michael 
Smith’s four-fold typology of roles (that is, market actor, security actor, diplomatic actor, and 
normative actor).38 Yet, the Union’s description of its attempted power projection in the world 
does not yet dare to rise above euphemisms. As if drafted on the principle ‘don’t mention the 
war’, the ESS shies away from explicitly invoking the use of force.39 
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The strategy’s ambiguity about concrete policy deliverables was attempted to be addressed 
more constructively in the ESS Implementation Report (ESSIR) of 2008 which specified the 
role of the European Defence Agency (EDA), Battlegroups, and Civilian Response Teams. It 
also included several new challenges, such as climate change, cyber, energy, and maritime 
security into the EU’s global laundry list.40 A host of smaller ‘sub-strategies’, ranging from 
specific regional strategic frameworks to functional policy guidelines (covering areas from 
counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation to cyber and maritime security) followed course, 
along with the adoption of a more comprehensive Internal Security Strategy. This put forth a 
call for ‘a European security model’, underscoring the protection of rights and freedoms; 
commitment to cooperation and solidarity between Member States; and prioritization of 
prevention, anticipation, and the targeting of ‘the causes of insecurity and not just the effects’, 
engaging all sectors relevant to public protection and recognizing the interdependence between 
internal and external security.41 By the EU’s proliferation of ‘writing security’ and strategic 
verbosity, it hardly comes across as a ‘quiet superpower’ anymore.42 
 
The EU Global Strategy of 2016 
The earlier optimism about the past mission of securing peace in Europe being almost entirely 
overtaken by the EU’s new mission of building peace around the world has been put into a 
sobering perspective in the EUGS.43 ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’ 
emerges ‘in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union’, when the 
European project itself has come under threat and its ‘purpose, even existence’ is ‘being 
questioned’.44 Keeping faith of the EU citizens in the continuous relevance of the Union, and 
‘forging unity’ across institutions, states, and peoples thus emerges as the main mission of this 
strategy post-Brexit, in the midst of a nasty upheaval of nationalism all over Europe after the 
migration surge and earlier solidarity crisis related to the fiscal troubles in the eurozone. 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and involvement in the Ukrainian crisis further 
underscore the sad realization that ‘peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given’. 
 
No wonder that the EUGS is, in fact, very much about the home turf: strengthening the EU as 
a security community and making it more resilient, especially in light of the recent terrorist 
attacks in the European ‘homeland’ which revealed the pathetic state of the intelligence-sharing 
and police cooperation in the Union. The self-diagnosis presented in the EUGS also takes due 
notice of the recent erosion of European values within the parts of the Union itself, reminding 
of the interdependence between the EU’s external credibility, influence, and the Union’s own 
consistency in living up to its self-proclaimed democratic values. These encompass respect for 
and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, justice, solidarity, 
equality, non-discrimination, pluralism, and respect for diversity. 
 
Yet, caving in is not regarded as an option as the traditional appeal for an outward- and forward-
looking European foreign and security policy is powerfully put forth (‘[t]he Union cannot pull 
up a drawbridge to ward off existential threats’). The intertwining of internal and external 
security is a fact – and hence ‘our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders’. In 
the spirit of speech act theory,45 a public commitment to be ‘a responsible global stakeholder’ 
is accordingly made, as if saying it out loud in the affirmative future clause (claiming that the 
EU indeed ‘will be’ one) makes it already real, or at least more probable in spe. A similar 
pledge – this time targeted on itself – is made about filling the mutual assistance and solidarity 
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clause pronounced in the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 with actual substance in order to translate the 
commitments of the member states into action. 
 
Compared to the tone adopted in the ESS, the understanding of security in the EUGS is more 
relative. Instead of a ‘secure’ Europe, a ‘stronger’ one has become the call of the day in the 
world described as ‘difficult, more connected, contested and complex’. Instead of previously 
more pronounced normative power allusions, Europe is now in the business of emanating its 
‘soft power’, not least via a better handling of its strategic communications. Of course, the EU 
is still keen on ‘mak[ing] a positive difference in the world’, addressing the root causes of 
conflict and poverty and championing the indivisibility and universality of human rights. Its 
faith in its own ‘enduring power of attraction’ being able to stimulate transformation to the 
Union’s east and south is seemingly intact, although it is evident that the Ukrainian upheaval 
and the souring of the Arab Spring has tempered the EU’s normative self-confidence 
considerably. The geographical scope of the EU’s ambitions for assuming responsibility is 
more emphatically ‘in Europe and its surrounding regions’ now, while pursuing engagement 
further afield is envisioned as more ‘targeted’. This healthy dose of realism is particularly 
pertinent after the most capable defence contributor has decided to leave the Union, thus 
seriously curbing the already questionable pool of resources and capabilities the EU has at its 
disposal for implementing its lofty strategic visions. In general, more emphasis is put on linking 
visions with implementation, for example via enlargement and migration policies. 
Important correctives are entered about the previously held overly optimistic stance on 
progressing towards a strategic partnership with Russia. The strategy clearly upholds the EU’s 
assertive policy line taken after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its involvement 
in the Ukrainian crisis. Russia’s fall from the EU’s grace – from ‘a major factor in our security 
and prosperity’ in the ESS to the country the relationship with which ‘represents a key strategic 
challenge’ – is indeed steep. ‘Resilience’ thus also concerns the protection of the European 
security order that Russia’s actions in Ukraine have significantly disturbed, showing the EU’s 
learning curve on the encounter between ‘postmodern’ and ‘modern’ security actors.46  
 
Likewise, the naïve – if good-willed – democracy promotion and good governance perspectives 
towards the Union’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods are revisited and kept in check with 
a healthy dose of ‘principled pragmatism’ which puts an emphasis on state and societal 
‘resilience’ instead. The USA and NATO continue to be the key imaginary interlocutors of the 
EUGS drafters:  the need for a ‘more credible European defence’ (that is, upping the EU’s 
defence spending against the mounting criticism of the Europeans’ free-riding on the American 
generosity) is recognized as essential for ‘a healthy transatlantic partnership with the United 
States’. The EU still seeks to be able to act autonomously in the field of security and defence, 
but is very clear about its aspiration to ‘deepen its partnership with NATO through coordinated 
defence capability development, parallel and synchronized exercises, and mutually reinforcing 
actions’. The UN as the framework of the multilateral system remains a core partner of the EU.  
 
While the list of threats the EU concerns itself about keeps growing (hybrid threats, economic 
volatility, climate change, and energy insecurity as more noteworthy additions), the emphasis 
on the EU’s global outreach as an environmentally conscious ‘market actor’ (cf. a ‘green actor’) 
is spelled out significantly better in the EUGS than its strategic predecessor. This is in line with 
the external perception of the EU as still more of an economic, rather than a normative, power.47 
It now appears as an emerging ‘cyber actor’ in the EUGS as well, promising to increase its 
focus on cyber security while keeping a strong commitment to open and free Internet. Implicit 
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punches are thus delivered to Russia and China who regard security and freedom to be 
incompatible aims in cyberspace governance.48  
 
If we use the ESS and EUGS as templates for assessing the EU’s status-seeking as a security 
actor in the international system via writing itself into existence as one, the Union’s elaboration 
of detail and comprehensive reach have certainly considerably increased over time. 
Meanwhile, the EU’s introspection has become soberer in its self-evaluation and ranking the 
Union relative to other (more traditional) security actors in the world. A concise exegesis of 
the EU’s two security strategies exposes an interesting dynamic: as exercises in ordering the 
world, that is, making the world intelligible for the EU and positioning the EU in the world in 
turn, both strategic guidelines have turned out to be major exercises in ordering the self.  
 
The ESS served as a strategic glue to mend the divisions within the EU over the invasion of 
Iraq by articulating the parameters of the EU’s common vision and security actorness in the 
world. Meanwhile, the EUGS in its notably well-composed (and indeed global) scope of 
strategic guidelines displays growing concerns about the Union’s ability to fulfil its historical 
mission to maintain peace and security even in Europe. It shows the EU as increasingly anxious 
to prove its relevance for its own citizens, yet notably less confident about the Union’s actual 
convincingness as an ontological security framework for its constituent members in 
comparison to the earlier ESS. While the EU’s confidence in the value of its unique set of 
capabilities as a comprehensive security actor has apparently grown, its status concerns about 
its place among the traditional security providers, such as the USA and NATO, remain yet to 
be sorted out in practice. 
 
Conclusion 
This brief reading of the EU’s security strategies from the ontological security perspective has 
highlighted the function of the ESS and EUGS as autobiographic narrations and rhetorical 
anchors in claiming the EU’s status as a global actor among the peers in the international 
society of states and traditional security organizations. Combining Mitzen’s insightful 
understanding of grand strategy as collective intention bridging actor preferences and 
action/behaviour with Steele’s and Huysmans’s distinct applications of the ontological security 
concept in IR, I proposed to render the ESS and EUGS as status symbols for the EU in its quest 
for global actorness in the comprehensive realm of security. The EU’s security strategies have 
been important sites for narrating the Union into existence as a security actor. 
A snapshot of the EU’s way of writing security via selective cuts into the ESS and the EUGS 
enables to trace the evolution of the Union’s macro-discourse in the broad field of security 
from the early 2000s up until today. The EU’s journey from the ESS to the EUGS can be 
conceived as a way of telling stories about the EU as a specific security actor and its relations 
to other global stakeholders. Further studies could inquire the degree to which the EU has 
actually earned international recognition and respect as a global actor of a particular kind in 
the eyes of its significant peers in the world as well as those of its own citizens.  
It is noteworthy that the EU’s notion of self as a security actor is increasingly framed as 
interdependent on a host of other (f)actors in its progression of writing security, that is, 
providing a strategic diagnosis of the world and presenting a particular story of its own agency 
in global affairs over time. As such, the road from the ESS to the EUGS offers a wealth of 
intriguing empirical material for scholars interested in the relational study of international 
politics.49 The increasing emphasis on relationality and inter-subjectivity is well-reflected in 
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the processes of drafting the respective documents. Whereas the ESS was written in a relatively 
tight circle, without any formal negotiations on the text in the EU institutions outside of Javier 
Solana’s office,50 the drafting process of the EUGS provides an exemplary case study of a very 
engaging approach whereby various think tanks in Europe and elsewhere were consulted along 
with the EU member states via various EU committees and networks, the Commission, and the 
European Parliament.51 It is only characteristic of the EU’s perpetual balancing between the 
national and transnational dynamics that the strategic reflection process and the actual drafting 
of the new global strategy for the Union nonetheless bear a noticeably Italian imprint (with 
Federica Mogherini, Nathalie Tocci, and Antonio Missiroli as the figureheads of the EUGS). 
Future research, linking the examination of the EU’s strategic visions and their actual 
implementation, could further address the inter-subjective dimension of the EU’s ontological 
security aspirations, or the Union’s maintenance of its self-concept in the world in and through 
relations with others via various practices of routinization.52 This is important as similarly to 
states, the EU’s security actorness is constituted through shared interpretations and mutual 
recognition – and through putting the ideas (and identity) in action/practice,53 by engaging with 
various peace-building missions and developing specific capabilities.54 The proof of the EU’s 
security actorness eventually remains in the pudding – in the Union’s actual ability to protect 
its people and territory and uphold its values at home and around the globe. For now, the most 
recent strategic deliberation of the EU is just good for the soul – which might not be a small 
feat considering the current state of the Union.  
 
	
1 Federica Mogherini, Speech by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, the EUISS Annual Conference 
‘Towards an EU Global Strategy–The Final Stage’, Paris, 22 April 2016. 
2 For example, Kjell Engelbrekt and Jan Hallenberg (eds), The European Union and Strategy: 
An Emerging Actor (London: Routledge, 2008); Thierry Tardy (ed.), European Security in a 
Global Context: Internal and External Dynamics (New York: Routledge, 2009); Christian 
Kaunert and Kamil Zwolski, The EU as a Global Security Actor: A Comprehensive Analysis 
beyond CFSP and JHA (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Xymena Kurowska and 
Fabian Breuer (eds), Explaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in 
Action (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Roy H. Ginsberg and Susan E. Penksa, The 
European Union in Global Security: The Politics of Impact (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012); Christoffer Kølvraa, Imagining Europe as a Global Player: The 
Ideological Construction of a New European Identity within the EU (Brussels: Peter Lang, 
2012); Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj (eds), The European Union as Diplomatic 
Actor (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
3 Cf. Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nougés, ‘The EU as a Modest “Force for Good”: 
The European Neighbourhood Policy’, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1 (January 2008), 
pp.81–96. 
4 The EU foreign policy has been famously described as ‘single in name, dual in policy-
making method, [and] multiple in nature’, thus pointing at the occasionally uneasy 




method. See Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European 
Union, 2nd edn, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p.61.  
5 As well evidenced by Floor Keuleers, Daan Fonck and Stephan Keukeleire, ‘Beyond EU 
navel-gazing: Taking stock of EU-centrism in the analysis of EU foreign policy’, 
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 51, No. 3 (2016), pp.345–64. 
6 John G. Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations’, International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp.139–74; cf. Robert 
Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (New York: 
Atlantic, 2004). 
7 Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 2002), pp.235–58. Manners listed peace and liberty, 
democracy, rule of law, human rights, social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable 
development, and good governance as constituting the normative basis of the EU. See also 
Lisbeth Aggestam, ‘Introduction: ethical power Europe?’, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 
1 (January 2008), pp.1–11. 
8 The Norwegian Nobel Committee, ‘The Nobel Peace Prize for 2012’, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/press.html (accessed 15 
September 2016). 
9 James Rogers, ‘From “Civilian Power” to “Global Power”: Explicating the European 
Union’s “Grand Strategy” Through the Articulation of Discourse Theory’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 47, No. 4 (September 2009), pp.831–62. 
10 Jozef Bátora and Nik Hynek, Fringe Players and the Diplomatic Order: The ‘New’ 
Heteronomy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
11 Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘A “tragic actor”? A realist perspective on “ethical power Europe”’, 
International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1 (January 2008), pp.29–44.  
12 Hiski Haukkala, ‘A Perfect Storm; or What Went Wrong and What Went Right for the EU 
in Ukraine’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 68, No. 4 (2016), pp.653–64, p.661.  
13 Christopher Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s 
International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3 (September 1993), 
pp.305–28. 
14 Kenneth McDonagh, ‘“Talking the Talk or Walking the Walk”: Understanding the EU’s 
Security Identity’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 53, No. 3 (May 2015), pp.627–
41, p.638. 
15 Alessia Biava, Margriet Drent and Graeme P. Herd, ‘Characterizing the European Union’s 
Strategic Culture: An Analytical Framework’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 49, 
No. 6 (2011), pp.1227–48, p.1230. 
16 See, for example, Ion Berindan, ‘Not another “grand strategy”: What Prospects for the 
Future European Security Strategy?’, European Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2013), pp.395–412. 
17 Nathalie Tocci, ‘The Making of the EU Global Strategy’, Contemporary Security Policy, 
Vol. 37, No. 3, this issue. 
18 Annegret Bendiek and Markus Kaim, ‘New European Security Strategy–The 
	 11	
																																																																																																																																																																								
Transatlantic’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) Comments 34, Berlin, 2015, p.2. 
19 See also Mai’a K. Davis Cross, ‘The Global Strategy and EU Diplomacy’, Contemporary 
Security Policy, Vol. 37, No. 3, this issue. 
20 Jennifer Mitzen, ‘Illusion or Intention? Talking Grand Strategy into Existence’, Security 
Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2015), pp.61–94, pp.70–71. 
21	Ibid., p.64. 
22 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). 
23 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Later Modern Age 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1991).  
24 For a recent reappraisal of the burgeoning literature on ontological security in IR, see the 
special issue ‘Ontological securities in world politics’, Cooperation and Conflict 
(forthcoming), especially the introduction by Catarina Kinnvall and Jennifer Mitzen, DOI: 
10.1177/0010836716653162, pp.1–9. For the keynote work on the EU and ontological 
security nexus, see Ian Manners, ‘European [Security] Union: From Existential Threat to 
Ontological Security’, IIS Working Papers, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2002/05; 
Jennifer Mitzen, ‘Anchoring Europe’s civilizing identity: habits, capabilities and ontological 
security’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp.270–85. In this 
journal, see Sean Kay, ‘Ontological security and peace-building in Northern Ireland’, 
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2012), pp.236–63. 
25 Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR 
State (New York: Routledge, 2008). This is in line with Zarakol’s transhistorical account, 
suggesting that the state is but one, and historically not an exclusive, form of ontological 
security provider. See Ayşe Zarakol, ‘States and ontological security: A historical 
rethinking’, Cooperation and Conflict (forthcoming), DOI: 10.1177/0010836716653158, 
pp.1–16.  
26 Cf. Brent J. Steele, ‘“Ideals that were really never in our possession”: Torture, Honor and 
US Identity’, International Relations Vol. 22, No. 2 (2008), pp.243–61. 
27 Jef Huysmans, ‘Security! What Do You Mean? From a Concept to Thick Signifier’, 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1998), pp.226–55. 
28 Ibid., p.245. 
29 See Catarina Kinnvall, ‘Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the 
Search for Ontological Security’, Political Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2004), pp.741–67, 
p.742. 
30 Huysmans, ‘Security!’ (note 27), p.242. See further Stuart Croft and Nick Vaughan-
Williams, ‘Fit for purpose? Fitting ontological security studies “into” the discipline of 
International Relations: Towards a vernacular turn’, Cooperation and Conflict (forthcoming), 
DOI: 10.1177/0010836716653159, pp.1–19. 
31 Margaret Somers maintains that ‘it is through narrativity that we come to know, understand 
and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives and narrativity that we 
constitute our social identities’. See Margaret R. Somers, ‘The narrative constitution of 
identity: A relational and network approach’, Theory and Society 23 (1994), pp.605–49, 
p.606. 
32 See Joshua Freedman, ‘Status insecurity and temporality in world politics’, European 
Journal of International Relations (forthcoming), DOI: 10.1177/1354066115603781, pp.1–
26; Ty Solomon, ‘Time and subjectivity in world politics’, International Studies Quarterly, 
	 12	
																																																																																																																																																																								
Vol. 58, No. 4 (2014), pp.671–81. See also T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson and William C. 
Wohlforth (eds), Status in World Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2014).   
33 See also Wolfgang Wagner and Rosanne Anholt, ‘Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s 
new leitmotif: Pragmatic, problematic, or promising?’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 
37, No. 3, this issue. 
34 European Council, ‘A secure Europe in a better world’, European Security Strategy, 
Brussels, 12 December 2003, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf 
(accessed 15 September 2016), p.10. 
35 See Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003). 
36 Asle Toje, ‘The consensus-expectations gap: Explaining Europe’s ineffective foreign 
policy’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No. 1 (March 2008), pp.121–41, pp.125–27. See also 
Antoine Rayroux, ‘Understanding “Constructive Ambiguity” of European Defence Policy: A 
Discursive Institutionalist Perspective’, in Caterina Carta and Jean-Frederic Morin (eds), EU 
Foreign Policy through the Lens of Discourse Analysis: Making Sense of Diversity (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2014), pp.227–44. 
37 Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap’ (note 13), p.317. 
38 Michael Smith, ‘Still Rooted in Maastricht: EU External Relations as a “Third-generation 
Hybrid”’, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 34, No. 7 (2012), pp.699–715, p.705. 
39 Asle Toje, ‘The 2003 European Security Strategy: A critical appraisal’, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2005), pp.117–33, p.121. 
40 European Commission, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Union Security 
Strategy–Providing Security in a Changing World’, EEAS Strategic Planning, Brussels, 
2008. 
41 European Council, ‘Internal security strategy for the European Union: Towards a European 
security model’, Brussels, 25–6 March 2010, pp.7–8. 
42 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Europe: the quiet superpower’, French Politics, Vol. 7, No. 3/4 
(2009), pp.403–22. 
43 ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’, A Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels, 28 June 2016, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2016/280616_global_strategy_en.htm (accessed 15 
September 2016). 
44 See Federica Mogherini’s foreword to the EUGS, 
https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-
union (accessed 15 September 2016). 
45 See J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). 
46 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations (note 6). 
47 Henrik Larsen, ‘The EU as a Normative Power and the Research on External Perceptions: 
The Missing Link’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp.896–910, p.905. 
48 Manners and Murray point at six narratives that have been used to describe the European 
integration project: ‘global Europe’, the ‘Nobel narrative of peace’, the ‘new narrative for 
Europe’, ‘economic Europe’, ‘social Europe’, and ‘green Europe’. See Ian Manners and 
Philomena Murray, ‘The End of a Noble Narrative? European Integration Narratives after the 




49 Cf. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, ‘Relations Before States: Substance, 
Process and the Study of World Politics’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 
5, No. 3 (1999), pp.291–332. 
50 Antonio Missiroli, ‘Towards an EU global strategy–Background, processes, references’, 
EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2015, pp.13–15. 
51 Tocci, ‘The Making of the EU Global Strategy’ (note 17). 
52 See, in particular, Mitzen, ‘Anchoring Europe’s civilizing identity’ (note 24); and Jennifer 
Mitzen, ‘Ontological security in world politics: state identity and the security dilemma’, 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2006), pp.341–70. 
53 See Erik Ringmar, ‘How the world stage makes its subjects: an embodied critique of 
constructivist IR theory’, Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 19, No. 1 
(2016), pp.101–25, pp.104–5. 
54 Cf. Birgit Poopuu, ‘Acting is everything: The European Union and the process of 
becoming a peacebuilder’, PhD dissertation, University of Tartu, 2016. 
